| Latimer Road 02:31 - Jun 14 with 95833 views | stowmarketrange |
A big fire in a tower block in Latimer Road just been reported on 5live.Eyewitness says there are people trapped on the upper floors.
I hope everyone gets out safely. |  | | |  |
| Latimer Road on 13:55 - Jun 25 with 3475 views | Brightonhoop |
Managed to report one post as abuse, fat fingers on a screen, disregard Norf please.
Interesting to hear from you fellas working in the industry and to understand it's not just housing, private and social, but offices, leisure centres, all sorts. Ffs what a mess.
I remember rock wool, if that's the only non-flammable stuff available it's obviously the only one to use. And yes a clerk of works. There's so many layers of management and no accountability it's no wonder people find loop holes with disastrous consequences. |  | | |
| Latimer Road on 18:42 - Jun 25 with 3349 views | Lblock |
| Latimer Road on 11:26 - Jun 25 by PunteR |
Lblock, ive always fitted hardboard insulation with a 50mm air gap as per instructions. Is the air gap the cause for fire to spread? Obviously was on Grenfell. Just wondered if that would be the case in other properties. Ive just finished 2 loft conversions, and its literally packed to the rafters with the stuff. |
I've stated a few pages back that Grenfell appears to have been the perfect storm - 2 inch air gap is standard to avoid condensation and, madly, cold bridging.
Many have said that Grenfell is exposed and in a western wind tunnel due to its height and orientation and this is a huge contributor but not a cause. Fire needs ignition, fuel and oxygen and once taken hold the more oxygen and fuel then the more intense and more likely spread. The cavity here would've given the spread of flame a massive updraft and if burning within it you might even of thought you'd all but stopped the fire but to then realise it's jumped three or four floors away from the human eye. In such a wind tunnel the spread of flame could increase tenfold I reckon.
I'm no expert and this isn't my field (I'm Commercial and not design / performance) but I forged an interest in this when doing about a years worth of Fire Risk Assessment works a long time ago. We were doing this for the DWP and were sort of self specifying on the upgrades to places. We made a good few quid....just to wind you lefties up!!!!
I've already said in here that almost every material will burn. You sometimes just accept that and deal with it by containment using much more expensive materials at certain spots. For me I always stuck by the old school rule of a compartment barrier being needed every 20 metres in a ceiling or floor void. You'd seal them off using a barrier such as firefly which is a wrapped rockwool or very expensive stuff like vicuclad or even supalux board. It gets more complicated then with insulation and integrity which is barrier of heat and degradation under fire attack.
Hindsight is a degree course most people would pass but here the whole tradegy and damage could've been reduced with proper barriers within the cavity and the cavity being vented in zones.
That's not to minimise the scandal of PIR insulation
I again want to raise the lack of focus being made on why so many did not escape. My personal feeling is it is totally wrong to be focusing and fixating on the rigid insulation board. This fire was unprecedented in loss of life but NOT in terms of scale and spread. Very recent examples have been seen in Dubai hotels and Japanese apartments and factories. Few or zero fatalities came out of those due to the fire fighting core(s) doing their jobs. I want questions answered about this:
Why did the escape core fill with toxic smoke? A combination of nat vent and mechanical forced vent should have ensured escape routes were clear for a minimum of an hour.
Were the fire doors and lobby's doing their jobs, if so had human intervention such as propping these open been allowed to become acceptable habit?
Was the escape stair kept clear, clean and tidy?
Were the regular checks and maintainence of these routes done ensuring alarms worked, emergency lights came on and stayed on?
Was the escape route adequately signed and were new residents inducted as to the building layout and routes in the event of a fire that needed evacuation?
I have also said fitting sprinklers everywhere in these buildings retrospectively is probably totally impractical but installing a mist drench system on escape routes should not be an issue, this would be away from people's dwellings and could operate on a double or triple knock basis meaning it only ever functions if it's 300% certain there's a significant fire.
Returning to modern day materials and the fact that most of us are sitting in matchboxes it's frightening isn't it? It is however a major national scandal that in the name of the environment the green lobby has allowed products that generate poisonous toxic smoke to become the norm in the U.K.
These materials are here to stay so we need to ensure design is correct and installation vigorously monitored. One last thing to bore you with. Consider this.
The average house fire burns at 600oC - that's a lab test. In reality once windows are blown out, it'll be much more.
The ignition point for aluminium is 650oC
For PIR it's about 450oC
For PUR I believe it's about 200oC
Yet untreated timber will not "self ignite" until around 300oC
So you'd go for aluminium yeah? What if I then pointed out to you once aluminium is alight it's a metal fire and these need to be fought using powder or foam and NOT water?
Take me back to the old days of timber stud packed with that itchy shite rockwool and I'll be a happy man.
Post note - sickens me to see McDonell making political gain over this tradegy. Cross party support is needed on immediate research and a change in the Building Regs; not point scoring
Sorry again for my ramble. I'm sure I'll read it back and spot a few glaring errors....much like Rydon's Compliancr Director no doubt. Nobody will die due to my negligence in this post though [Post edited 25 Jun 2017 18:47]
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| Cherish and enjoy life.... this ain't no dress rehearsal |
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| Latimer Road on 20:42 - Jun 25 with 3254 views | TacticalR |
All samples from 34 sites sent to the Building Research Establishment have failed combustibility tests.
'Every sample of cladding from high-rise buildings that have been tested in the wake of the Grenfell Tower disaster has failed checks for combustibility, the government has said, in a development that will significantly magnify worries over fire safety.
Sajid Javid, secretary of state for Communities and Local Government, announced the failure rate in a statement issued on Saturday evening. Mr Javid said in the notice that samples from 34 sites in 17 local authority areas had failed tests for combustibility.'
Fire test failure rate raises concerns on high-rise safety (FT, 24th June 2017)
https://www.ft.com/content/9d4c9f76-5918-11e7-9bc8-8055f264aa8b |  |
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| Latimer Road on 21:12 - Jun 25 with 3221 views | PunteR |
| Latimer Road on 18:42 - Jun 25 by Lblock |
I've stated a few pages back that Grenfell appears to have been the perfect storm - 2 inch air gap is standard to avoid condensation and, madly, cold bridging.
Many have said that Grenfell is exposed and in a western wind tunnel due to its height and orientation and this is a huge contributor but not a cause. Fire needs ignition, fuel and oxygen and once taken hold the more oxygen and fuel then the more intense and more likely spread. The cavity here would've given the spread of flame a massive updraft and if burning within it you might even of thought you'd all but stopped the fire but to then realise it's jumped three or four floors away from the human eye. In such a wind tunnel the spread of flame could increase tenfold I reckon.
I'm no expert and this isn't my field (I'm Commercial and not design / performance) but I forged an interest in this when doing about a years worth of Fire Risk Assessment works a long time ago. We were doing this for the DWP and were sort of self specifying on the upgrades to places. We made a good few quid....just to wind you lefties up!!!!
I've already said in here that almost every material will burn. You sometimes just accept that and deal with it by containment using much more expensive materials at certain spots. For me I always stuck by the old school rule of a compartment barrier being needed every 20 metres in a ceiling or floor void. You'd seal them off using a barrier such as firefly which is a wrapped rockwool or very expensive stuff like vicuclad or even supalux board. It gets more complicated then with insulation and integrity which is barrier of heat and degradation under fire attack.
Hindsight is a degree course most people would pass but here the whole tradegy and damage could've been reduced with proper barriers within the cavity and the cavity being vented in zones.
That's not to minimise the scandal of PIR insulation
I again want to raise the lack of focus being made on why so many did not escape. My personal feeling is it is totally wrong to be focusing and fixating on the rigid insulation board. This fire was unprecedented in loss of life but NOT in terms of scale and spread. Very recent examples have been seen in Dubai hotels and Japanese apartments and factories. Few or zero fatalities came out of those due to the fire fighting core(s) doing their jobs. I want questions answered about this:
Why did the escape core fill with toxic smoke? A combination of nat vent and mechanical forced vent should have ensured escape routes were clear for a minimum of an hour.
Were the fire doors and lobby's doing their jobs, if so had human intervention such as propping these open been allowed to become acceptable habit?
Was the escape stair kept clear, clean and tidy?
Were the regular checks and maintainence of these routes done ensuring alarms worked, emergency lights came on and stayed on?
Was the escape route adequately signed and were new residents inducted as to the building layout and routes in the event of a fire that needed evacuation?
I have also said fitting sprinklers everywhere in these buildings retrospectively is probably totally impractical but installing a mist drench system on escape routes should not be an issue, this would be away from people's dwellings and could operate on a double or triple knock basis meaning it only ever functions if it's 300% certain there's a significant fire.
Returning to modern day materials and the fact that most of us are sitting in matchboxes it's frightening isn't it? It is however a major national scandal that in the name of the environment the green lobby has allowed products that generate poisonous toxic smoke to become the norm in the U.K.
These materials are here to stay so we need to ensure design is correct and installation vigorously monitored. One last thing to bore you with. Consider this.
The average house fire burns at 600oC - that's a lab test. In reality once windows are blown out, it'll be much more.
The ignition point for aluminium is 650oC
For PIR it's about 450oC
For PUR I believe it's about 200oC
Yet untreated timber will not "self ignite" until around 300oC
So you'd go for aluminium yeah? What if I then pointed out to you once aluminium is alight it's a metal fire and these need to be fought using powder or foam and NOT water?
Take me back to the old days of timber stud packed with that itchy shite rockwool and I'll be a happy man.
Post note - sickens me to see McDonell making political gain over this tradegy. Cross party support is needed on immediate research and a change in the Building Regs; not point scoring
Sorry again for my ramble. I'm sure I'll read it back and spot a few glaring errors....much like Rydon's Compliancr Director no doubt. Nobody will die due to my negligence in this post though [Post edited 25 Jun 2017 18:47]
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Lots of info there Lblock, lots to think about. Great post. |  |
| Occasional providers of half decent House music. |
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| Latimer Road on 14:19 - Jun 26 with 3034 views | QPR_Jim |
| Latimer Road on 18:42 - Jun 25 by Lblock |
I've stated a few pages back that Grenfell appears to have been the perfect storm - 2 inch air gap is standard to avoid condensation and, madly, cold bridging.
Many have said that Grenfell is exposed and in a western wind tunnel due to its height and orientation and this is a huge contributor but not a cause. Fire needs ignition, fuel and oxygen and once taken hold the more oxygen and fuel then the more intense and more likely spread. The cavity here would've given the spread of flame a massive updraft and if burning within it you might even of thought you'd all but stopped the fire but to then realise it's jumped three or four floors away from the human eye. In such a wind tunnel the spread of flame could increase tenfold I reckon.
I'm no expert and this isn't my field (I'm Commercial and not design / performance) but I forged an interest in this when doing about a years worth of Fire Risk Assessment works a long time ago. We were doing this for the DWP and were sort of self specifying on the upgrades to places. We made a good few quid....just to wind you lefties up!!!!
I've already said in here that almost every material will burn. You sometimes just accept that and deal with it by containment using much more expensive materials at certain spots. For me I always stuck by the old school rule of a compartment barrier being needed every 20 metres in a ceiling or floor void. You'd seal them off using a barrier such as firefly which is a wrapped rockwool or very expensive stuff like vicuclad or even supalux board. It gets more complicated then with insulation and integrity which is barrier of heat and degradation under fire attack.
Hindsight is a degree course most people would pass but here the whole tradegy and damage could've been reduced with proper barriers within the cavity and the cavity being vented in zones.
That's not to minimise the scandal of PIR insulation
I again want to raise the lack of focus being made on why so many did not escape. My personal feeling is it is totally wrong to be focusing and fixating on the rigid insulation board. This fire was unprecedented in loss of life but NOT in terms of scale and spread. Very recent examples have been seen in Dubai hotels and Japanese apartments and factories. Few or zero fatalities came out of those due to the fire fighting core(s) doing their jobs. I want questions answered about this:
Why did the escape core fill with toxic smoke? A combination of nat vent and mechanical forced vent should have ensured escape routes were clear for a minimum of an hour.
Were the fire doors and lobby's doing their jobs, if so had human intervention such as propping these open been allowed to become acceptable habit?
Was the escape stair kept clear, clean and tidy?
Were the regular checks and maintainence of these routes done ensuring alarms worked, emergency lights came on and stayed on?
Was the escape route adequately signed and were new residents inducted as to the building layout and routes in the event of a fire that needed evacuation?
I have also said fitting sprinklers everywhere in these buildings retrospectively is probably totally impractical but installing a mist drench system on escape routes should not be an issue, this would be away from people's dwellings and could operate on a double or triple knock basis meaning it only ever functions if it's 300% certain there's a significant fire.
Returning to modern day materials and the fact that most of us are sitting in matchboxes it's frightening isn't it? It is however a major national scandal that in the name of the environment the green lobby has allowed products that generate poisonous toxic smoke to become the norm in the U.K.
These materials are here to stay so we need to ensure design is correct and installation vigorously monitored. One last thing to bore you with. Consider this.
The average house fire burns at 600oC - that's a lab test. In reality once windows are blown out, it'll be much more.
The ignition point for aluminium is 650oC
For PIR it's about 450oC
For PUR I believe it's about 200oC
Yet untreated timber will not "self ignite" until around 300oC
So you'd go for aluminium yeah? What if I then pointed out to you once aluminium is alight it's a metal fire and these need to be fought using powder or foam and NOT water?
Take me back to the old days of timber stud packed with that itchy shite rockwool and I'll be a happy man.
Post note - sickens me to see McDonell making political gain over this tradegy. Cross party support is needed on immediate research and a change in the Building Regs; not point scoring
Sorry again for my ramble. I'm sure I'll read it back and spot a few glaring errors....much like Rydon's Compliancr Director no doubt. Nobody will die due to my negligence in this post though [Post edited 25 Jun 2017 18:47]
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You make some great points LBlock, I'm an engineer so my knowledge of fire is fairly limited as it's normally detailed out by the Architects. That is if they are competent, which as you allude to earlier in the thread (I think it was you but I can be bothered to check) is increasingly difficult to be sure of. I've worked with many an Architect and it's scary the level some are at, more than once I've been left with one fresh from Uni and left to their own devices with no support from above. The senior Architects are mainly interested in concept designs where they can produce high level drawings then walk away and leave everyone else to figure out how to make it work. When I first started it was normally an Architectural technician but these seem to be scarce these days and I'm not sure how much focus is put into the technical side of Architecture at uni either.
Anyway for private properties I think it's going to be dependent on insurance (as you touched upon), if the insurers don't penalise people for having PIR behind plasterboard, as it's deemed to give fire protection (Ceilings, loft conversions, some walls etc) then it shouldn't be too much of a problem. If they do a blanket ban on insuring properties with it anywhere then I imagine much panic. From a personal perspective I'm not too worried about PIR in my house so long as there's plasterboard between the PIR and the room and a decent fire alarm system.
I know the "green lobby" as you call it is going to take a pummeling over the use of PIR insulation but the government for their part only provided a target U value for building parts (walls, roofs etc) so they didn't force anybody to use PIR. PIR is used as it achieves the U-value in less space than the equivalent rockwool would and at a lower cost to an insulator like superquilt. So the industry was given a choice and they used the best value product. |  | | |
| Latimer Road on 14:53 - Jun 26 with 3008 views | johncharles |
Just heard on the news that one of the Camden (evacuated) tower blocks has taken delivery of 300 fire check doors and closers. Didn't get the details Does this mean the FC doors were not up to standard ? Or not fitted in the first place ??
Worrying. |  |
| Strong and stable my arse. |
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| Latimer Road on 15:28 - Jun 26 with 2963 views | Boston |
As a youngster I occasionally was the unfortunate sod picked to spray fireproofing on metal in commercial buildings...dirty job, but god can metal burn, remember it was made by a forge in the first place.
In my opinion 50/75% of steel frame fire doors are poorly hung, because they're trickier / more frustrating than wood and when they malfunction they're rarely fixed properly for exactly the same reasons.
Sprinklers should always be fitted in common parts.
I hate working with Rockwool, but we use it everywhere, always in commercial and multi family property....because it works.
Having done the clean up on a number of west London semi detached fires, it's fcuking horrifying what burns. Never forgot the amazed feeing I got when, as a 19 yr old, I first saw double glazing melting, running down the side of the building and freezing in place like an icicle. |  |
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| Latimer Road on 15:45 - Jun 26 with 2941 views | 2Thomas2Bowles |
| Latimer Road on 14:53 - Jun 26 by johncharles |
Just heard on the news that one of the Camden (evacuated) tower blocks has taken delivery of 300 fire check doors and closers. Didn't get the details Does this mean the FC doors were not up to standard ? Or not fitted in the first place ??
Worrying. |
If it's true and to me would indicate there were none or very few, you would not need to replace 300 otherwise |  |
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| Latimer Road on 16:41 - Jun 26 with 2852 views | Boston |
| Latimer Road on 15:45 - Jun 26 by 2Thomas2Bowles |
If it's true and to me would indicate there were none or very few, you would not need to replace 300 otherwise |
Doors have different fire blocking capacities, next to nothing, half hour, one hour etc. You'd need to find out a bit more insitu info. | |
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| Latimer Road on 18:08 - Jun 26 with 2787 views | londonscottish |
| Latimer Road on 18:42 - Jun 25 by Lblock |
I've stated a few pages back that Grenfell appears to have been the perfect storm - 2 inch air gap is standard to avoid condensation and, madly, cold bridging.
Many have said that Grenfell is exposed and in a western wind tunnel due to its height and orientation and this is a huge contributor but not a cause. Fire needs ignition, fuel and oxygen and once taken hold the more oxygen and fuel then the more intense and more likely spread. The cavity here would've given the spread of flame a massive updraft and if burning within it you might even of thought you'd all but stopped the fire but to then realise it's jumped three or four floors away from the human eye. In such a wind tunnel the spread of flame could increase tenfold I reckon.
I'm no expert and this isn't my field (I'm Commercial and not design / performance) but I forged an interest in this when doing about a years worth of Fire Risk Assessment works a long time ago. We were doing this for the DWP and were sort of self specifying on the upgrades to places. We made a good few quid....just to wind you lefties up!!!!
I've already said in here that almost every material will burn. You sometimes just accept that and deal with it by containment using much more expensive materials at certain spots. For me I always stuck by the old school rule of a compartment barrier being needed every 20 metres in a ceiling or floor void. You'd seal them off using a barrier such as firefly which is a wrapped rockwool or very expensive stuff like vicuclad or even supalux board. It gets more complicated then with insulation and integrity which is barrier of heat and degradation under fire attack.
Hindsight is a degree course most people would pass but here the whole tradegy and damage could've been reduced with proper barriers within the cavity and the cavity being vented in zones.
That's not to minimise the scandal of PIR insulation
I again want to raise the lack of focus being made on why so many did not escape. My personal feeling is it is totally wrong to be focusing and fixating on the rigid insulation board. This fire was unprecedented in loss of life but NOT in terms of scale and spread. Very recent examples have been seen in Dubai hotels and Japanese apartments and factories. Few or zero fatalities came out of those due to the fire fighting core(s) doing their jobs. I want questions answered about this:
Why did the escape core fill with toxic smoke? A combination of nat vent and mechanical forced vent should have ensured escape routes were clear for a minimum of an hour.
Were the fire doors and lobby's doing their jobs, if so had human intervention such as propping these open been allowed to become acceptable habit?
Was the escape stair kept clear, clean and tidy?
Were the regular checks and maintainence of these routes done ensuring alarms worked, emergency lights came on and stayed on?
Was the escape route adequately signed and were new residents inducted as to the building layout and routes in the event of a fire that needed evacuation?
I have also said fitting sprinklers everywhere in these buildings retrospectively is probably totally impractical but installing a mist drench system on escape routes should not be an issue, this would be away from people's dwellings and could operate on a double or triple knock basis meaning it only ever functions if it's 300% certain there's a significant fire.
Returning to modern day materials and the fact that most of us are sitting in matchboxes it's frightening isn't it? It is however a major national scandal that in the name of the environment the green lobby has allowed products that generate poisonous toxic smoke to become the norm in the U.K.
These materials are here to stay so we need to ensure design is correct and installation vigorously monitored. One last thing to bore you with. Consider this.
The average house fire burns at 600oC - that's a lab test. In reality once windows are blown out, it'll be much more.
The ignition point for aluminium is 650oC
For PIR it's about 450oC
For PUR I believe it's about 200oC
Yet untreated timber will not "self ignite" until around 300oC
So you'd go for aluminium yeah? What if I then pointed out to you once aluminium is alight it's a metal fire and these need to be fought using powder or foam and NOT water?
Take me back to the old days of timber stud packed with that itchy shite rockwool and I'll be a happy man.
Post note - sickens me to see McDonell making political gain over this tradegy. Cross party support is needed on immediate research and a change in the Building Regs; not point scoring
Sorry again for my ramble. I'm sure I'll read it back and spot a few glaring errors....much like Rydon's Compliancr Director no doubt. Nobody will die due to my negligence in this post though [Post edited 25 Jun 2017 18:47]
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Wasn't one of the contributing factors the fact that the flats are supposed to be sealed internally but that mods had included drilling holes through the concrete walls to fit (gas?) pipes. This helped fumes and fire out of the flat(s) and into the lobbies and stair wells. |  |
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| Latimer Road on 18:12 - Jun 26 with 2779 views | Boston |
| Latimer Road on 18:08 - Jun 26 by londonscottish |
Wasn't one of the contributing factors the fact that the flats are supposed to be sealed internally but that mods had included drilling holes through the concrete walls to fit (gas?) pipes. This helped fumes and fire out of the flat(s) and into the lobbies and stair wells. |
Blame the plumbers....we usually do. | |
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| Latimer Road on 18:38 - Jun 26 with 2734 views | 2Thomas2Bowles |
Camden
Just been on the news that up to 1000 fire doors were not fitted | |
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| Latimer Road on 18:55 - Jun 26 with 2698 views | johncharles |
| Latimer Road on 16:41 - Jun 26 by Boston |
Doors have different fire blocking capacities, next to nothing, half hour, one hour etc. You'd need to find out a bit more insitu info. |
No.
There are 1/2 hour fire check doors (1/2HFC) and 1 hour fire check doors (1HFC) Other doors are just doors, known as egg box doors and have as much fire protection as that suggests. | |
| Strong and stable my arse. |
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| Latimer Road on 21:06 - Jun 26 with 2626 views | MrSheen |
| Latimer Road on 18:38 - Jun 26 by 2Thomas2Bowles |
Camden
Just been on the news that up to 1000 fire doors were not fitted |
Still, the council leader is a Rangers fan, so no harm done. |  | | |
| Latimer Road on 21:51 - Jun 26 with 2595 views | Boston |
| Latimer Road on 18:55 - Jun 26 by johncharles |
No.
There are 1/2 hour fire check doors (1/2HFC) and 1 hour fire check doors (1HFC) Other doors are just doors, known as egg box doors and have as much fire protection as that suggests. |
Oh, pardon my Welsh. | |
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| Latimer Road on 22:27 - Jun 26 with 2565 views | distortR |
44 years ago we had the Summerland disaster over here, a small fire in an old kiosk jumped on to the cladding of the summerland leisure centre and over 50 people lost their lives. The number of deaths was exacerbated by locked fire doors etc.
We've been here before  .
No individual was found culpable by the public enquiry | | | |
| Latimer Road on 23:37 - Jun 26 with 2486 views | johncharles |
| Latimer Road on 21:51 - Jun 26 by Boston |
Oh, pardon my Welsh. |
Welsh ? You should be so lucky.
What I was trying to say was that all these doors might look alike but anyone working with them would know immediately which was which.
I could carry hollow core doors up a flight of stairs 3 at a time
1/2 FC much heavier, 1 at a time
1HFC - no thank you. | |
| Strong and stable my arse. |
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| Latimer Road on 00:24 - Jun 27 with 2460 views | TacticalR |
'Arconic, the US engineering group that produced the cladding panels fitted to London’s Grenfell Tower when it was gutted in a fire earlier this month, has announced it will no longer sell the flammable version for use in high-rise buildings.'
--
'Reuters reported at the weekend that six emails sent between Arconic’s UK sales manager and executives at the contractors working on Grenfell Tower made clear Arconic employees knew the flammable version of the cladding was being fitted to a high-rise tower – even though some of the company’s own literature said such panels were not suitable for buildings more than 40 feet high.
The Reynobond PE panels that will no longer be sold for use in buildings more than 40 feet high, roughly the height of most firefighting ladders. Grenfell Tower is about 220 feet (67m) tall.'
Flammable Grenfell panels withdrawn from sale for high-rises (FT, 26th June 2017)
https://www.ft.com/content/33fc44d8-5a88-11e7-b553-e2df1b0c3220 | |
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| Latimer Road on 00:43 - Jun 27 with 2448 views | Brightonhoop |
| Latimer Road on 00:24 - Jun 27 by TacticalR |
'Arconic, the US engineering group that produced the cladding panels fitted to London’s Grenfell Tower when it was gutted in a fire earlier this month, has announced it will no longer sell the flammable version for use in high-rise buildings.'
--
'Reuters reported at the weekend that six emails sent between Arconic’s UK sales manager and executives at the contractors working on Grenfell Tower made clear Arconic employees knew the flammable version of the cladding was being fitted to a high-rise tower – even though some of the company’s own literature said such panels were not suitable for buildings more than 40 feet high.
The Reynobond PE panels that will no longer be sold for use in buildings more than 40 feet high, roughly the height of most firefighting ladders. Grenfell Tower is about 220 feet (67m) tall.'
Flammable Grenfell panels withdrawn from sale for high-rises (FT, 26th June 2017)
https://www.ft.com/content/33fc44d8-5a88-11e7-b553-e2df1b0c3220 |
Yeah but you gotta pick a pocket or two. | | | |
| Latimer Road on 15:04 - Jun 27 with 2335 views | TacticalR |
It's getting complicated...
'Building safety experts have warned that government tests on tower block cladding in the wake of the Grenfell Tower disaster lack transparency and are too simplistic to be used to condemn blocks as unsafe.
Fire risk consultants and architects have suggested the government should reveal what tests were being conducted on the material after it was revealed every single cladding sample sent for analysis had failed the new assessment.'
--
'Experts have warned that far more comprehensive tests on the entire cladding system are needed to establish if buildings are as at-risk as Grenfell was, including the insulation and design details such as fire stops.'
Tower cladding tests after Grenfell fire lack transparency, say experts
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/26/tower-block-cladding-tests-after | |
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| Latimer Road on 15:09 - Jun 27 with 2328 views | 2Thomas2Bowles |
| Latimer Road on 15:04 - Jun 27 by TacticalR |
It's getting complicated...
'Building safety experts have warned that government tests on tower block cladding in the wake of the Grenfell Tower disaster lack transparency and are too simplistic to be used to condemn blocks as unsafe.
Fire risk consultants and architects have suggested the government should reveal what tests were being conducted on the material after it was revealed every single cladding sample sent for analysis had failed the new assessment.'
--
'Experts have warned that far more comprehensive tests on the entire cladding system are needed to establish if buildings are as at-risk as Grenfell was, including the insulation and design details such as fire stops.'
Tower cladding tests after Grenfell fire lack transparency, say experts
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/26/tower-block-cladding-tests-after |
Well it lite up ok at nigh when Grenfell was on fire
That's transparent
Whether they use a match or a flamethrower, this stuff kills. [Post edited 27 Jun 2017 17:13]
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| Latimer Road on 17:10 - Jun 27 with 2241 views | GloryHunter |
| Latimer Road on 11:19 - Jun 25 by johncharles |
Walk down any street in any residential part of London (or anywhere else I suppose) and you'll find loads of extensions being built. They're all packed with Celotex and ever cheaper alternatives. You'd be surprised how cheap some of these can be. God only knows what they're made of.
Rockwool is the only non-flammable insulation but it's more expensive. [Post edited 25 Jun 2017 11:26]
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Not true that Rockwool is non-flammable. I've seen the London Fire Brigade called out to extinguish a burning stack of Rockwool on site - it was set alight by sparks falling on it from a welder's torch. |  | | |
| Latimer Road on 17:27 - Jun 27 with 2219 views | GloryHunter |
| Latimer Road on 10:10 - Jun 25 by Lblock |
Can I ask what your attitude / suggested approach is for "private" house owners who are in exactly the same boat?
In many of my boring posts I have laboured the point that PIR (and it's more flammable cousin PUR) insulation is EVERYWHERE. There will be countless leaseholders under RTB in these blocks who presumably the councils have a duty of care to but think for a minute about purchasers in totally private blocks. What happens with these people? Even more so, what happens when insurance companies start putting exclusions clauses in due to this national scandal?
My own house that I'm sitting in my garden looking at is riddled with PIR products. It's in the roof of the loft extension, it's in the walls I moved, its in the floor and roof of the kitchen extension and it even lines the underside of my bath FFS. Just what is supposed to happen in this situation for a large number of that 68%?????
The green lobby got their way and the data sheet of these products doesn't cause you too much alarm at first but then you see just what gases it gives off etc.
But apparently it stops your heating being on for an extra 45 minutes a day.
I've been saying for years there will be a modern day equivalent to the asbestos scandal but I always thought it would be MDF. God knows what happens next with this one [Post edited 25 Jun 2017 11:04]
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The good news is that all foam products break down, and surprisingly quickly, too. I've opened up 20-year-old cavity walls and found the aluminium front and back sheets of the Celotex or Kingspan, but very little in between them - just a pile of fine brown dust at the bottom of the cavity.
Mineral wool fibre disintegrates as well. If you go up into the loft of a 1960s house you might think it never had any loft insulation, but then you'll often find a very thin layer of black fibrous dust on top of the plasterboard. The fibres become brittle, and it collapses under its own weight. | | | |
| Latimer Road on 08:38 - Jun 28 with 2077 views | hubble |
Still no official lists of survivors or genuine estimates of those who have died..
"Newly formed Grenfell Tower residents’ groups have begun several parallel investigative attempts to compile lists of the victims and survivors of the London fire disaster, amid ongoing concern that the police and council have been slow to release information about the death toll."
"..there is frustration among residents that officials have not released a number of those people who survived, or an estimate of the numbers of people ordinarily resident in the block."
"“We were expecting the TMO [tenant management organisation] to do this list for us, but we don’t think they are willing to help us,” he said, referring to Kensington & Chelsea TMO, the body that looked after the block for the local authority.
Jamalvatan said he was trying to organise a meeting between the council and all of the survivors, in one place, but that it was proving difficult to arrange. “They don’t want to face 400 people in a room. They prefer to deal with us individually.”
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/28/grenfell-residents-groups-compil |  |
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| Latimer Road on 11:54 - Jun 28 with 2020 views | johncharles |
| Latimer Road on 17:10 - Jun 27 by GloryHunter |
Not true that Rockwool is non-flammable. I've seen the London Fire Brigade called out to extinguish a burning stack of Rockwool on site - it was set alight by sparks falling on it from a welder's torch. |
It's non combustible, I stand corrected. You saw what you saw but I don't believe genuine Rockwool could be set alight by sparks from a welders torch. All wool/fibre insulation tends to be called Rockwool just as all board insulation gets called Celotex but there a lot cheap and shoddy alternatives around. [Post edited 28 Jun 2017 14:22]
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| Strong and stable my arse. |
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